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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF
1976: A VIEW FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Problem: "Most Americans ... cannot afford to hire a law-
yer if their constitutional rights are violated or if they are
victims of illegal discrimination. Most Americans simply can-
not obtain free legal services, no matter how meritorious
their cases may be."'
Response: In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision
of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title
IX... or in any civil action... charging a violation of...
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the




Theoretically, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 offers all private citizens the financial means to vindicate
their civil rights. The Awards Act provides that aggrieved parties
in meritorious civil actions "may" receive a reasonable attorney's
fee. Commentators envisioned the Awards Act as a boon to liti-
gants and attorneys because it would simultaneously open the door
to individuals with meritorious claims who could not otherwise af-
ford to enforce their rights, and would enable private practitioners
to commit themselves to civil rights litigation.3 They saw the
Awards Act as benefitting all citizens through active litigation of
civil rights.
1. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTrUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH
CONG., 2D SEss., THE CIVIL RIGHTS A'roRNY's FnS AwARDs ACT OF 1976, SOURCE BooK:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DocuMENTs, 269 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
cited as SOURCE BOOK].
2. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988)
[hereinafter cited as Awards Act].
3. Derfner, One Giant Step: The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21
ST. Louis U. L.J. 441 (1977). See generally SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 3-5; Hermann &
Hoffman, Financing Public Interest Litigation in State Court: A Proposal for Legislative
Action, 63 CORNEuL L. REv. 173 (1978); Malson, In Response to Alyeska-The Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 430 (1977).
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The Awards Act, however, guarantees little. As in many fee
shifting statutes, the language of the Awards Act reflects only a
general Congressional desire to allow awards. No guidelines for
awarding fees were set; Congress deferred almost exclusively to ju-
dicial interpretation and discretion in applying the Act.' Because
the courts' range of discretion is unstated and unfathomable, attor-
neys and their clients realize that a meritorious suit may not result
in adequate compensation, despite the statutory mandate. Liti-
gants attempting to vindicate their rights should know the range of
the court's discretion; they should be able to determine under what
circumstances the courts will grant an attorney's fee award. Attor-
neys too should be able to determine whether or not fees will be
-awarded and, more importantly, how much the award is likely to
be. The uncertainty in when and to what extent awards will be
granted restricts the volume of civil rights litigation and defeats
the purpose of the legislation because the
full compensation element is an essential corollary to the encouragement of
private enforcement .... [t]he standard provides a reasonable certainty as
to the appropriateness and the amount of an award and enables the plain-
tiffs, defendants, and their counsel to make a realistic assessment of the risks
and costs involved in prosecuting or defending [an action].'
Uncertainty of receiving adequate compensation may also mean
that a client receives less than adequate legal representation. If
practitioners are uncertain that they will receive a full award for
all hours worked, they may be unable or unwilling to devote the
necessary time to thoroughly prepare a case.
It is the uncertainty that this Comment will examine: its
4. See Comment, Attorney's Fees Under Federal Civil Rights Legislation, 24 ViLL. L.
REv. 215, 221 (1978-79); Thome, The Courts' Discretion in Assessing Fees Under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 283 (1979). For a list of
90 statutory fee award provisions, see Sotmc. BOOK, supra note 1, at 303 app.
5. Heinsz, Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable
Standard, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 259, 265 (1977). See, e.g., HEARINGS ON THE EFlFCr OF LEGAL
FEES ON THE ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION BEFORE TnE SUBCOMM. ON REPRESENTATION OF
CrrMENS INTEREsTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93rd Cong., lst Sess., pt. III,
888-1024 (Reapportionment Cases) & 1060-62. (Hearings indicated that fee awards are es-
sential for full enforcement of federal civil rights statutes.) Congress noted that "fee awards
are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance." SOURCE BooK,
supra note 1, at 9. See also Note, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 52
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 562 (1978); Comment, note 4 supra. ("Congress has provided a statutory




causes and possible solutions. Concentration will be on cases
decided under the Awards Act in the Second Circuit." The key dis-
cretionary factor, the determination of the fees awards, will be ex-
amined to show that its computation is not adequately docu-
mented by the Second Circuit courts even though specific
guidelines for entitlement to an attorney's fee award have emerged
in other circuits. A survey of these computation methods will
demonstrate that articulated standards for awards, supervised by
meaningful appellate review, is necessary to facilitate meaningful
implementation of the Act's goals. Because the civil rights man-
date is almost totally dependent on private enforcement,7 a lack of
articulated standards in effect means that neither clients nor attor-
neys pursue just claims and the effect of that statute is greatly di-
minished. The result is that those Americans whose constitutional
rights have been violated are left without a solution to the
problem.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS
When necessary, despite a strong tradition in American com-
mon law,8 courts and legislatures devised exceptions to the Ameri-
can Rule that required litigants to pay their own fees. These ex-
ceptions existed primarily if the American Rule resulted in
injustice or did not serve public policy.,
6. State and federal courts were authorized by the Awards Act to award counsel fees
"in actions brought under specified sections of the United States Code relating to civil and
constitutional rights." 122 CONG. REc. 35122 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinnan, House floor
manager for the Awards Act). Although there is no express statutory provision in New York,
the lower New York courts have upheld "unequivocally ... that section 1988 of title 42 of
the United States Code is fully applicable to proceedings pending in the courts of [New
York] . . . ." Bess v. Toia, 66 A.D.2d 844, 844, 411 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (2d Dept. 1979).
7. S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th CONG., 2d SEss. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908-09. See also SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 8.
8. Under the American Rule, each party in a lawsuit pays his own counsel, unlike the
English Rule under which fees are routinely awarded to the prevailing party. See Goodhart,
Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929), for a detailed explanation of the machinery for fixing and
assessing fees and costs under English law. In support of the English Rule, see Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALnF. L. REv. 792 (1966);
Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 COLO. L. REv. 202
(1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv.
1216 (1967).
9. See generally Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act, SO COLum. L. Rxv. 346, 349 (1980); Note, supra note 5, at 564-68.
Comment, supra note 4, at 216-21.
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The most significant exception to the American Rule was the
private attorney general exception. 10 "If litigants 'benefited their
class' and 'effectuated a strong congressional policy,' they were
deemed to be private attorneys general and thus entitled to a fee
award.""' Legislators, recognizing that many statutory rights could
only be enforced effectively by private attorneys general, included
attorney's fees provisions in a variety of enactments, 2 indicating
strong Congressional acceptance of and reliance on these provi-
sions for enforcement.' 3 After 1964, all major civil rights laws
passed by Congress included one or more such fee shifting provi-
sions. The lower federal courts faced with this plethora of statuto-
rily mandated fees applied the private attorney general exception
and granted attorney's fees in many civil rights suits."
In granting these awards, lower courts rested on the Supreme
Court's decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.15 In
Newman, brought under Title H of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Court reasoned that the attorney's fees provisions were an at-
tempt to assist and promote private litigation under statutes indi-
cating high congressional priorities:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that en-
forcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in
part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the
10. Id.
11. Note, supra note 5, at 568-69, citing Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.
1972).
12. Federal statutory fees provisions may operate to shift fees in several ways:
mandatorily to the prevailing plaintiff; mandatorily to the prevailing party; at the court's
discretion to the prevailing party, at the court's discretion to either party. See SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 1, at 303 app.; Note, supra note 5, at 563 nn.4 & 6.
13. S. REP., supra note 7, at 3; SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 9-10, e.g., Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)(1980); The Equal Employment Amend-
ments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b); and The Voting Rights Extension Act of 1975, 42
U.S.C. § 19731(e). Many of the most commonly used statutes are remarkably similar. Com-
pare Civil Rights Act of 1964, title H, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b): "In any action commenced
pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party...
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.. ." and Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k): "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.. ." with Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, text accompanying note 2 supra.
14. SouRcE BOOK, supra note 1, at 291 app. Civil rights suits in which attorney's fees
awards were made are cited in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
270 n.46 (1975).
15. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Suit was brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title II, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1964) which prohibits racial discrimination in public accommodations.
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law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an
action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunc-
tion, he does so for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general,"
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority....
It follows that one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under that
Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust."'
Extrapolating from Newman, the lower federal courts granted fees
awards in civil rights suits that had no specific statutory authoriza-
tion for awards if they found a high congressional priority and a
benefit to a class.17
As long as the common law private attorney general exception
existed, specific statutory fees provisions were unnecessary. In
1975, however, the Supreme Court abolished the private attorney
general exception in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society."' Statutory fees provisions then assumed a singular impor-
tance. If Congress wanted to continue to use fees awards to en-
courage the private enforcement of pre-1964 civil rights statutes,
two options existed to revitalize those awards. It could enact a
considerable number of specific attorney's fees provisions for the
substantive statutes that lacked them, or it could enact a broad
attorney's fees provision covering broad areas of constitutional liti-
gation. Congress chose the latter route.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act was enacted as a
direct response to Alyeska's elimination of the private attorney
general concept. In their haste to close this "anomalous gap,"19
however, Congress tracked the already familiar language of Titles
II, VII and other statutes under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Conse-
quently, the Awards Act, like its predecessors, is vaguely written,
offers no guidelines and leaves proper application almost entirely
to the discretion of the courts. The legislative history indicates
only Congress' implicit reliance on the courts to continue to inter-
16. 390 U.S. at 401-02 (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Sims v. Ames, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. AL 1972).
18. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Alyeska indicated that authority to grant fees could come from
only two sources: either the court's historic equity power or a statute authorizing a fee
award. Id. at 247. The Court reasoned that Congress had accepted the American Rule and
had made exceptions under those certain statutes that protect federal rights. Id. The short-
lived private attorney general concept was abolished.
19. The Senate debated Pub. L. No. 94-559 for 5 days. The House of Representatives
debated and passed the bill on the same day. SouRCE BOOK, supra note 1, at xvii, 18-21.
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pret the statute against the standards already developed.20
In fact, the Awards Act provides just one affirmative test for
the courts: attorney's fees may be awarded only to a "prevailing
party." Under Titles H and VII, the most often utilized fees
awards statutes, 21 have interpreted "prevailing party" to mean one
whose claim is successful in obtaining some or all of the relief origi-
nally requested. 2 Having established the prevailing party, the stat-
ute directs the court to award a "reasonable attorney's fee. '23 This
determination, however, is left to the discretion of the court, using
guidelines developed under existing fee shifting provisions. The
legislative history offers similarly vague guidance by directing the
courts to grant awards: (1) large enough to attract competent coun-
sel24 but not so large as to appear to be a bonanza; 25 (2) compara-
ble to the prevailing fees attorneys would charge fee paying cli-
ents;26 (3) comparable to fees or awards in other complex federal
litigation;27 and (4) "reasonable." Determining if a party is eligible
and then figuring an award under these criteria is a formidable
task for the courts but necessary for the attorneys who must de-
cide whether they can afford to litigate under the Act.
II. ESTABLISHING ELIGIBILITY FOR ATTORNEY'S FFEs AWARDS
In establishing eligibility for awards the Second Circuit has
made determinations in an evenhanded and careful manner. The
guidelines for eligibility emerge on a case-by-case basis, as Con-
gress intended. The various criteria to establish eligibility must be
met before an award can be computed.
A. The Prevailing Party
The Awards Act states that the "prevailing party" must be al-
20. "Because other statutes follow this approach, the courts are familiar with these
terms and in fact have reviewed, examined and interpreted them at some length." Souc.
BooK, supra note 1, at 214.
21. See note 13 supra.
22. See text accompanying notes 28-35 infra.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
24. S. REP., supra note 7, at 6; SouRCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 12.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. ("It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under S. 2278 be governed by
the same standards which prevail in other types of equally c6mplex Federal litigation
[Vol. 29
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lowed an award. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the party
seeking to vindicate rights protected by these statutes will be the
plaintiff.28 By a finding that the plaintiff was granted the relief re-
quested, the court establishes that the plaintiff is the "prevailing
party." Although in theory a prevailing defendant also could be
granted fees, such an award is unlikely.29 Commentators suggest
this is because courts refrain from finding that a plaintiff has liti-
gated in bad faith in order to avoid "chilling" the plaintiff's exer-
cise of his civil rights. He would be doubly deterred by the possi-
bility of being required to pay the defendant's attorney's fees
should his suit prove unsuccessful.30 The directive that fees be
paid to the "prevailing party" was intended primarily to discour-
age meritless suits.$1
The Second Circuit recognizes that the form of the judicial
proceeding in which the relief is granted is irrelevant if the plain-
tiff prevails. Parties are considered to have prevailed when their
rights are vindicated. A full hearing before a judge or jury is un-
necessary; a consent judgment or decree is sufficient. 2 For exam-
28. S. REP., supra note 7, at 4; SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 10. Congress anticipated
that sometimes the prevailing party is the defendant or defendant/intervenor. Successful
defendants, however, do "not appear before the Court cloaked in the mantle of public inter-
est." United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975), cited in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 214. Prevailing defendants may only receive an award if the
action which they are required to defend against is "vexatious, frivolous" or was instituted
to "harrass" or "embarrass" the defendant, or if the plaintiff's suit was motivated by "mal-
ice or vindictiveness," 519 F.2d at 364, a determination which would trigger the common law
"bad faith" exception. See Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976), a
Title VII suit, ordering the plaintiff to pay $500 of defendant's attorney's fees because she
had deliberately perjured herself, waged a campaign to obtain false testimony and litigated
with meritless "malice and vindictiveness." Id. at 728. See also Kane v. City of New York,
468 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
An intervening defendant may also qualify as the prevailing party. See Prate v. Freed-
man, 583 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1978). A consent decree was awarded to remedy racially discrimi-
natory hiring in violation of Title VII by the Rochester, New York Police Department. How-
ard v. Freedman, Civ. No. 74-234 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), cited in Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp.
1373, 1374 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). Repeated attempts to challenge the consent decree were ad-
judged "vexatious" and the intervening defendant was adjudged the prevailing party,
thereby enabling the defendant/intervenor to receive an attorney's fee award. Accord Baker
v. Detroit, 49 U.S.L.W. 2387 (Nov. 17, 1980) (E.D. Mich.) following Prate.
29. See generally Belton, Feeing the Unfee'd Lawyer: Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights
Litigation, 5 LIGATION 32 (Winter, 1979).
30. SoUc BOOK, supra note 1, at 197.
31. Id. at 268.
32. Id. at 215. See also Note, supra note 9, at 360.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ple, in Carey v. Gaslight Club of New York,3" a Title VII suit, a
black waitress alleging employment discrimination was awarded
attorney's fees after a hearing. Ms. Carey was automatically the
prevailing party when the Division of Human Rights directed the
employer to offer her the position and back pay she had requested.
This interpretation of prevailing party has been followed to grant
awards in Second Circuit civil rights cases that do not reach court.
In Gagne v. Maher' the plaintiff, a working AFDC recipient
brought suit against Connecticut's Commissioner of Social Ser-
vices. The parties negotiated a settlement out of court and the dis-
trict court entered a consent decree.85 Plaintiff was awarded attor-
ney's fees. The initial finding that one is a prevailing party,
however, does not automatically trigger an award of attorney's
fees; it is only one prerequisite to entitlement.
B. Substantial Constitutional Claim
Besides prevailing, the plaintiff must establish that he has a
substantial constitutional claim. Problems arise because plaintiffs
often bring suit alleging several causes of action under several acts
based on the identical facts. The court may not reach the constitu-
tional issue or may decide the claim under the statute that does
not mandate attorney's fees. Because such plaintiffs often have an
adjudicable constitutional claim that the court chooses not to ad-
dress, the Awards Act allows attorney's fees to be granted if the
court determines that there is a "common nucleus of operative
facts"386 or that the claims are so interrelated that plaintiffs would
ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceeding. 7
Conversely, courts may deny the award if the constitutional claim
33. 598 F.2d 1253 (1979), af'd, 100 S. Ct. 2024 (1980). Accord, Booker v. Brown, 619
F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1980). See also Comment, 11 RUT. CAM. L.J. 145 (1979). The decision to
award fees in Carey is without precedent, id. at 150, and represents a particularly generous
and expansive approach, id. at 152. The "Carey [decision] may encourage greater participa-
tion of the private bar in civil rights litigation ... ." Id. at 153.
34. 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd other grounds, 444 U.S. 824 (1980).
35. When defendant has voluntarily ceased a practice after the complaint is filed, the
Second Circuit has indicated that the court may award attorney's fees, although no formal
relief is granted. Davis v. village Park 11 Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1978).
36. SOURCE BooK, supra note 1, at 212 n.7. See also United Mine Workers of America
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
37. See Wolf, Pendent Jurisdiction, Multi-Claim Litigation, and the 1976 Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. Rav. 193 (1979).
[Vol. 29
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is "plainly unsubstantial" or "obviously without merit,"3 8 thereby
discouraging "the fabrication of spurious federal claims."39
The Second Circuit has decided several suits involving non-fee
statutory claims coupled with potential constitutional claims and
has granted the attorney's fees awards when the facts under the
non-fee claim would go to proving the Awards Act claim. Gagne v.
Maher4 ° illustrates the circuit's concern with adjudicating rights
without "undermining the longstanding judicial policy of avoiding
unnecessary decision of important constitutional issues. '41 Simi-
larly the New York Court of Appeals found in Holley v. Lavine42
that the plaintiff's claim, decided for the plaintiff on statutory
grounds, involved "significant federal rights."4 In both cases, at-
torneys' fees were awarded to the prevailing party.
In order to make the determination that a common nucleus of
facts exists that would prove either a constitutional or statutory
claim, the court must carefully delineate the issues and the facts
that apply to each issue. The trial court must, in effect, hypothe-
size the nonadjudicated lawsuit.
Although most of the reported cases in which the substantial
constitutional issue is left unadjudicated are brought in federal
courts, plaintiffs are increasingly litigating these issues in state fo-
rums.44 Young v. Toia45 ilustrates the difficultv state trial courts
Ln-v;L ie-Fz'r.d'.' 6o.So t zLe'Jerng ' a t2afiguis uo.V.,
U.S. 103, 105 (1933).
supra note 5, at 577. See also Seals v. Quarterly County Ct., 592 F.2d-390
7).
7.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979).
t 342. The prevailing party was determined in a consent decree.
T.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979). The Court in Holley held that reduction of the plain-
,enefits under § 131-k of the New York Social Services Law violated the Fed-
3curity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602(a)(10) and 606(b)(1). The plaintiff also ar-
.e court did not consider, that she had been denied protection under the
Lmendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
.2d at 646, quoting 464 F. Supp. 718, 725 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Beazer v.
ty Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440
19). The Court of Appeals held that the transit authority's refusal to employ
1 addicts who were enrolled in or had completed methadone maintenance pro-
d the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
preme Court expressed great dismay that the lower courts had not first adjudi-
;utory claim.
supra note 37, at 240. See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980).
D.2d 377, 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (4th Dept. 1979).
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federal and state law. The plaintiff in Young v. Toia sought an
injunction against enforcement of the state social services act, re-
quiring employable home relief recipients to work an average of
three full days per week regardless of the amount of their monthly
benefits. 46 Besides alleging violation of the minimum wage provi-
sions of the New York State Constitution, the plaintiff also alleged
a violation of her equal protection and due process rights under
federal law.47 The trial court held that the state law violated the
state constitution. Because their finding was based on state law,
the lower court declared that the Awards Act was inapplicable.
The Appellate Division overruled the trial court, stating that
where, as in this case, the same facts would have been used to
prove a violation of the federal statute, the Awards Act could be
applied.48
Adjudication for the plaintiff that either explicitly or implic-
itly validates a strong congressional policy by confirming a viola-
tion of a statute designed to protect fundamental civil rights and
also benefits a discernible class. usually justifies an attorney's fee
award. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,49 the Supreme
Court upheld the granting of an injunction against a discrimina-
tory practice and the award of attorney's fees because congres-
sional policy as incorporated in Title H was vindicated and because
all citizens, black and white alike, benefited through this vindica-
tion.50 Both the Second Circuit and the New York Court of Ap-
peals interpret this to require that a benefit be conferred on a dis-
cernible class before attorney's fees are awarded to prevailing
parties.5 1 In Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc.,5 2 the
46. Section 8, Ch. 77 of the Laws of 1977, known as "the work rule."
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
48. 66 A.D.2d at 380,413 N.Y.S.2d at 532. See also Ashley v. Curtis, 67 A.D.2d 828, 413
N.Y.S.2d 528 (4th Dept. 1979); Bess v. Toia, 66 A.D.2d 844, 411 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dept.
1978) (Appellate Division denied fees under the Awards Act, requiring that plaintiff show a
"bona fide civil rights claim"). See also Wolf, supra note 37, at 236-40.
49. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
50. Id. at 402.
51. See Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976). In a suit brought under the Voting
Rights Act Amendment of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (another statute to be used by the
courts as a guideline for granting fees under the Awards Act, S. REP., supra note 7, at 2;
SouRcE Boox, supra note 1, at 6), the plaintiff sought both bilingual school boards and
general election officials and materials. The court, in granting the requested relief, approved
an award of attorney's fees, noting that plaintiffs were protecting voting rights in the public
interest and were vindicating an important congressional policy. 538 F.2d at 12 n.2.
[Vol. 29568
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New York Court of Appeals, in granting attorney's fees, noted that
a decision for the plaintiff conferred a substantial benefit on a
identifiable class, migrant workers, 53 (even though they were not a
party to the lawsuit) and the suit was "vindicating a congressional
policy of the highest priority."" Problems arise, however, when the
benefit derived is a vindication of a right but is not clearly one that
has received strong congressional sanction or where the benefit-
ted class requires definition.
The Second Circuit will not award fees when either element is
absent. In Naprsted v. City of Norwich,56 the constitutionality of a
curfew for minors was attacked. The district court invalidated an
antiquated and rarely enforced curfew, but denied attorney's fees
because there was no evidence that this litigation validated a
strong congressional policy.57 Stopping just short of calling the suit
"vexatious,"58 the court found that an award would be unjust.5 9
Likewise, if the suit, though brought legitimately under sec-
tion 1983, redresses only private grievances, the prevailing party is
not entitled to an award. For example, in Zarcone v. Perry,60 the
plaintiff prevailed against a federal district judge who had abused
and falsely imprisoned him. Zarcone was denied attorney's fees be-
cause only he as the plaintiff benefitted from the judgment. The
court noted that if the claim had involved civil rights of broad sig-
nificance or legal issues of recurrent public importance, or rights
that effected a large class, a plaintiff might be entitled to attor-
ney's fees under the Awards Act. 1 It should be noted, however,
52. 578 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 197S).
53. Title HI-B of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2861 et seq.
Federal funding for legal services to migrant workers is provided for in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996 et
seq.
54. Id. at 37. Special legislation to protect the class is evidence of this congressional
policy.
55. Strong congressional policy is often found where a statute specifically granting at-
torney's fees has been enacted.
56. 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). The ordinance forbade children under 17 years
of age from being on the streets or in public places after 11:00 p.m. Sunday through Thurs-
day and after midnight on Saturdays and Sundays.
57. See Note, supra note 5, at 583.
58. The plaintiff refused to meet with Norwich city officials who were willing to recon-
cile the ordinance through redrafting, thereby obviating the need for a suit. Id. at 1371.
59. Id. at 1370-71.
60. 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
61. See generally Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 47 U. Cm. L. Ray. 332 (1980). But see Heigler v.
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that the identifiable class benefited need not be large. In Holley v.
Lavine,62 fees were awarded where the successful suit conferred a
benefit on a small group, all other illegal aliens collecting AFDC
benefits who had official assurance that they would not be de-
ported. The court awarded fees, finding that a right was vindicated
on behalf of an identifiable class despite its "miniscule" size.63
C. Criteria Negating Eligibility
Despite meeting all eligibility requirements, a plaintiff may
not be awarded attorney's fees if the court determines that he
would be able to attract competent counsel without the award.
This is because the purpose of the Awards Act is to encourage vig-
orous enforcement of civil rights through the promise of awards by
plaintiffs who could not otherwise afford counsel. The Second Cir-
cuit in Zarcone stated that the trial judge should determine
whether the plaintiff would be financially capable of attracting
competent counsel without a fee award." Zarcone was denied an
award because he had a contingency fee arrangement with his at-
torney in a case where his prospects for a substantial recovery were
good from the outset. 5 The court concluded that denial of "coun-
sel fees would not present a significant barrier to institution and
prosecution of a suit for damages."66
Courts prefer to grant awards of attorney's fees to impecuni-
ous plaintiffs. Underlying this preference is the determination that
granting fees to a plaintiff who could have brought suit without
depending on the Awards Act is not in keeping with the congres-
sional intent. This bias is supported by the legislative history of
the Awards Act:
Congress must insure that citizens have the means to go to court and to be
effective once they get there. This is particularly true in the civil rights area,
where those men and women whom the law protect [sic] are rarely, if ever, in
Gatter, 463 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (the plaintiff brought suit against Philadelphia po-
lice officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest and imprisonment, assault, battery
and malicious prosecution. Although the jury awarded damages of $1,166 and punitive dam-
ages of $10,400 to the plaintiff, attorney's fees were also granted.).
62. 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978).
63. 553 F.2d at 849.
64. 581 F.2d at 1044.
65. The court awarded the plaintiff $80,O0O in compensatory damages and $61,000 in




a financial position to undertake the costly task of enforcement of their
rights.
67
Although Congress could have limited awards to insolvent plain-
tiffs, it did not do so. The legislative history supports the conclu-
sion that neighter contingent fee arrangements nor the plaintiff's
financial solvency will negate eligibility under the Act. Congress
wanted to insure that constitutional litigation would continue in
spite of evermounting costs, a problem "exacerbated by the fact
that the income and assets of the private litigant, that is to say,
the average American citizen . . . is extremely limited ....
While a plaintiff may be financially able to commence litigation,
the potential cost of appeals may force even a moderately wealthy
plaintiff to retreat from litigation.6 '
III. ESTA3LISHING THE RASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE AwARD
The decisive factor in attracting competent counsel to litigate
individual civil rights, assuming all the eligibility criteria are met,
is the amount of the fee award. A potential plaintiff and his attor-
ney need assurance at the outset that an adequate and readily as-
certainable payment will be forthcoming.70 When courts articulate
both their reasons for granting or denying an award and the spe-
cific calculations used in determining awards, prospective litigants
67. SouacE BOOK, supra note 1, at 19.
68. Id. at 37.
69. Id. See Allowance of Attorneys Fees in Civil Rights Action, 7 COLUM. J. OF L. &
Soc. PROD. 381 (1971). In 1964, the cost of a civil rights suit in federal court, from trial to a
petition for certiorari, was estimated at $15,000 to $18,000. Id. at 381. A rough adjustment
for inflation alone would increase the costs 21/2 times: i.e., $37,500 to $45,000..
Other circuits separate the issue of entitlement to the award from factors which may
ultimately have a bearing on the amount of the award, like contingency fee arrangements or
the plaintiff's personal financial status. See, e.g., Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (lst Cir.
1978).
The Court should address the issue of entitlement [to attorney's fees] as an an-
tecedent and separate question, applying the Newman standard, without regard
to the existence of a private fee agreement. Should it decide that an award of
fees is warranted, the Court then should set a reasonable fee. This determination
too should be divorced from consideration of a fee arrangement.
Id. at 648. See also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Collins, 609 F.2d
151 (5th Cir. 1980); Bunn v. Central Realty of La., 592 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979) ("the plain-
tiff's ability to pay is not a 'special circumstance' that would prohibit an award of attorney's
fees under § 1988." Id. at 892); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Aho v.
Clark, 608 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1979).
70. See Note, supra note 9, at 372.
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can effectively assess their chances of fee recovery. The Second
Circuit's failure to set forth standards for determining awards,
therefore, not only results in confusion 1 but also could result in
fewer civil rights suits by private individuals.
Congress directed the courts to use the twelve basic standards
established in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.7 1 in set-
ting fees.73 Johnson, a Title VII class action, consumed four years
of litigation and resulted in a fee award that the plaintiff chal-
lenged as inadequate. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for re-
calculation of the award, stating that it could review the reasona-
bleness of the district court's determination of attorney's fees only
if the district court stated the reasons for its decision. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit asked for consideration of twelve
factors it deemed important: (1) the time and labor required; (2)
the novelty and difficulty of the issues; (3) the skill requisite to
perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of the attor-
ney from other employment; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the
fee was fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the result
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attor-
neys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length
of the attorney's professional relationship with the client; and (12)
awards in similar cases.75 The Johnson court declined to co-opt the
discretion of the trial judge by reducing the calculation of the
award to a series of mathematical steps, but the court emphasized
that "adequate" compensation is necessary "to enable an attorney
to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and in-
dependence of the profession. '" The guidelines were to assist in
balancing just compensation against fears of windfalls for
attorneys.
71. The confusion stems from lower courts having to apply vague or unarticulated stan-
dards. Often this means an attorney who feels he was not properly compensated by the
lower court will then appeal, adding to his expense and the court's burden.
72. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
73. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 216, also citing cases in which the Johnson standard
has been correctly applied: Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
74. "[M]eaningful review requires a record that reflects such consideration [of the
twelve factors]." 488 F.2d at 720.
75. Id. at 717-19.
76. Id. at 720.
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With the exception of the Second, Third and Sixth, the cir-
cuits" have interpreted the congressional directive to use Johnson
to mean that awards should be explained through a literal run-
through of the factors as they apply to the facts of a particular
case. Judges in these circuits are required to state specific amounts
and the reasons for the amounts awarded. Prospective litigants
and attorneys then know from recorded opinions how much was
awarded and why.
A. Determination of Standards for Awarding Fees in the Second
Circuit
1. An Example of Clearly Articulated Standards: The Fifth
Circuit The district courts in the Fifth Circuit are careful to artic-
ulate their reasoning and the balancing process used for awarding
attorney's fees. All twelve Johnson factors were addressed recently
in Pugh v. Rainwater 8 by the district court. This section 1983 case
was brought on behalf of Florida prisoners and argued on state and
federal constitutional issues. The time and labor required (factor
(1)) to deal with the novel and difficult issues (factor (2)) raised
was 615.25 hours.7 The court noted that the attorney's skill (factor
(3)) was "extraordinary."80 To determine factor (5), a customary
fee, the Pugh court asked for and received affidavits from other
attorneys in the district who handled similar types of litigation.
77. D.C. Circuit: National Council of Commun. Mental Health Centers v. Mathews, 546
F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1976); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel,
503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
First Circuit King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978).
Fourth Circuit Baker v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1979). See also McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38, 42 (W.D. Va.
1978).
Eighth Circuit: Crain v. City of Mountain Home, Ark., 611 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1979);
Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1978).
Ninth Circuit: Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978).
Tenth Circuit: Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1979).
78. 465 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1979). The complaint was brought on two issues: the
state issue of probable cause for determination of pretrial detention and the federal consti-
tutional issue of the amount of bail required as a condition for release of indigent detainees.
Both issues were decided, but the federal question was later declared moot. Fees were
granted on the probable cause portion. Id. at 42.
79. The novelty and difficulty of the issues raised was determined by the number of
other cases, articles and law review articles generated by the decision. Id. at 44.
80. Id.
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The court considered factor (12), the fee awards made in recent
cases in the same district."1 The district court concluded that $90
to $100 per hour was a reasonable rate for the attorney's time.82
Although factors 4 and 6-8 were not relevant in the fee determina-
tion, each factor was discussed before the final "fair and equitable"
award of $55,371.50 was made to plaintiff's attorney.8 s The practice
of elucidating amounts of awards and the reasoning underlying
each decision is standard in the Fifth Circuit.8" To add emphasis to
the need for reviewable award determinations, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals either affirms the amounts when the twelve
Johnson factors are adequately documented, 5 or remands to the
district court to specifically consider some or all of the twelve
factors."6
2. Other Articulated Standards: The Third and Sixth Cir-
cuits The Third Circuit developed its own guidelines from case
precedents which are similar in effect to Johnson.87 Their own
multi-step approach, which is geared toward complex suits, first
calculates a "lodestar": the reasonable hourly rate of the attor-
ney(s), 88 multiplied by the number of hours expended,89 and then
calculates adjustments for exceptional "quality in the legal skills
81. Experienced lawyers suggested $135 and $125 per hour. The court in International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Hayes, 438 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D. Fla. 1977) granted
civil rights attorneys $100 per hour; in Abrams v. Reno, 452 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
the court granted awards based on $80 per hour.
82. 465 F. Supp. at 45.
83. Id.
84. See Cole v. Tuttle, 462 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (award of $7,500 for 116
hours, specifying that postage, clerical and copying expenses should be considered as part of
attorney's office overhead); Armstrong v. Reed, 462 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (factors
(1) through (5) from Johnson were irrelevant).
85. Reviewability and, therefore, supervision by the appellate courts is of primary im-
portance to attorneys and litigants. See, e.g., Harldess v. Sweeny Independent School Dist.,
608 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1979); Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 581 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978) (Fifth Circuit upheld challenged award be-
cause Johnson factors had been fully considered).
86. See, e.g., Kingsville Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th
Cir. 1980); Concerned Democrats of Fla. v. Reno, 601 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1979).
87. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy II); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy 1). See generally Comment,
supra note 4, at 228-41.
88. "[T]aking into account his or her reputation, status, and normal billing rate." Id. at
229. (Johnson factors 1, 5, and 9).
89. Id. (Johnson factor 1).
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employed"' 0 and for the possibility of defeat.91 As in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals emphasizes the need for
district courts to document calculation of the "lodestar."9 2 Once
the calculation is made, discretionary adjustments are possible,3
increasing or decreasing the fee "in light of the important substan-
tive purposes of the Civil Rights Act."9 4
Although the district courts are compelled to articulate their
reasoning and conclusions to facilitate appellate review, adjust-
ments still remain within the lower courts' discretion. For example,
in Holy Spirit Assoc. for the Unification of World Christianity v.
Caughey,95 the district court carefully considered evidence on all
relevant factors." The court articulated its calculation of the lode-
star and any additional factors that were considered in determin-
ing the final amount. Carefully calculated awards granted in artic-
ulate- and documented opinions facilitate appellate review. They
also give attorneys a fair indication of the award they can expect
and the supporting documentation they will need.
The Sixth Circuit has further simplified the factors that their
courts should consider in calculating awards, stating:
90. Id. (Johnson factor 3).
91. See notes 100-06 and accompanying text infra.
92. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 169.
93. Holy Spirit Assoc. for the Unification of World Christianity v. Caughey, 455 F.
Supp. 1154, 1158 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
94. Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 489 (3d Cir. 1978).
95. 455 F. Supp. 1154 (M.D. Pa. 1978). For a list of cases decided in the Third Circuit,
see Keown v. Storti, 456 F. Supp. 232, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
1979). Minor changes have been made to the Third Circuit guidelines whenever new factors
have required inclusion. See, e.g., Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978)
(regarding appeals for attorney's fees); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (Merola 1), 493 F.2d
292 (3d Cir. 1974); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (Merola HI), 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975)
(regarding affidavits or other evidentiary submissions in support of fees applications).
96. See McPherson v. School District # 186, 465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. IMI. 1978) (an excel-
lent example of the way in which courts can document relevant factors). The Seventh Cir-
cuit also uses a "lodestar" type calculation. The court recorded an exceptionally thorough
breakdown of time charts and billable hours for several attorneys. The district court judge,
Ackerman, also directed the timing of the payments, including the rate of interest to be
utilized in the distribution. Id. at 757. Because the court wanted to make a fair and equita-
ble lodestar calculation, the defendant's attorney's time sheets were compared with plain-
tiff's attorney's sheets. This comparison reaffirmed the judge's independent appraisal since
defendant's attorney billed for a greater number of hours than plaintiffs. The district judge
additionally noted that his carefully considered objective opinion "is subjective to the extent
it reflects how one judge resolves the competing claims in arriving at a 'reasonable' amount
of dollars." Id.
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We have learned through experience... that merely providing a check list
of factors to consider does not lead to consistent results, or, in many cases,
reasonable fees. Many of the factors are overlapping, and there is no guidance
as to the relative importance of each factor, or indeed, how they are to be
applied in a given case. We conclude that an analytical approach, grounded in
the number of hours expended on the case, will take into account all the
relevant factors, and will lead to a reasonable result.0
Despite this simplification* the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has
noted that the district courts' failure to clearly state their reason-
ing in granting an award based on the necessary findings of fact,
and supported by explanations of the calculations used to arrive at
a fee award, would be unacceptable at the time of appellate re-
view.98 Stating that a uniform approach "is necessary in order that
we may discharge our statutory duty to award a 'reasonable' fee,"
the court held that an award that is arbitrary or conclusory is not
reasonable, and is not, therefore, fair to the parties.99
Commentators, who are beginning to evaluate the factors and
methods used in calculating attorney's fees awards, are proposing
refinements to increase fairness to both plaintiffs and attorneys. 00
One proposes an additional factor to the Sixth Circuit's ap-
proach:101 the hours justifiably expended, multiplied by the attor-
ney's market rate, should then be multiplied by the risk of
nonrecovery. 102 This would apply the practical experience of attor-
neys in suits without statutory fee provisions to Awards Act calcu-
lations. The experience of the market place illustrates that attor-
neys will represent clients only after they bargain for a percentage
of the recovery based on what the attorney perceives as the risk of
97. Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 642 (6th Cir.
1979).
98. Id. at 637.
99. Id. at 636.
100. See Brown, Calculation of Attorney's Fees: Franchise and Antitrust Relief, 2 W.
NEw ENG. L. Rnv. 297 (1979); Note, supra note 9, at 374-77.
101. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L.
Rsv. 281 (1977). Berger deliberately rejects certain Johnson factors in his formula. The dol-
lar amount of recovery, factor (8) of Johnson, is irrelevant since many civil rights cases
involve only injunctive or declaratory relief. Consideration of preclusion of other employ-
ment, Johnson's factor (4), is likewise unnecessary because the attorney who receives an
award is being compensated for the time spent. Consideration of awards in other similar
cases (Johnson's (12)) amounts to post hoe rationalization and ignores inflation. The quality
of the attorney's work (Johnson's (3)) is eliminated from consideration, unless it is clearly
excessive.
102. Id. at 324-26.
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nonrecovery of fees."o' To fairly apply this, the Court would calcu-
late the number of hours expended, multiply by the attorney's fair
market value per hour, and then inquire about the possibility of
success in the suit as it appeared at the outset, in effect, a hind-
sight "success" test.1' 4 If there was no reasonable chance that
plaintiff would lose or if the attorney's fee is guaranteed by the
client, the risk factor is zero. If there was a fifty percent chance
that the suit would be successful, the risk factor is two. Under this
proposed system, the fee determination is essentially reduced to a
series of factual questions, and results in a more predictable re-
sult.10 5 Inconsistencies in the present system are minimized. Re-
duction of the number of awards that are too high, or more often
too low eliminates an excessive amount of complicated and time-
consuming litigation over fee amounts.0 "
In the circuits where the amount of theaward and the reason-
ing behind the factors used is articulated, prospective litigants and
their attorneys receive adequate notice. This certainty and predict-
ability encourages litigation of civil wrongs.
3. Unarticulated Standards: Criteria in the Second Circuit
Even before the enactment of the Awards Act, certain types of liti-
gation were encouraged; courts regularly awarded fees under other
fee shifting statutes. As noted, the circuits extracted standards for
applying the Awards Act froin precedent set under these earlier
statutes.10 The Second Circuit in City of Detroit v. Grinnell
103. Id. See generally, Scott v. Bradley, 455 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Va. 1978).
104. The tangible factors which comprise the "risk of litigation" might be deter-
mined by asking the following questions: has a relevant government action been
instituted or, perhaps, even successfully conducted against the defendant; have
related civil actions already been instituted by others; and are the issues novel
and complex or straight-forward and well worn? Thus determined, the litigation
risk factor might well be translated into mathematical terms.
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 449, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
105. See Berger, supra note 101, at 326.
106. Id. at 292. But see Scott v. Bradley, 455 F. Supp. at 675-76. When lawyers are
setting their rates based on a risk of recovery, clients are free to reject the proposed fee.
However, in a determintion under the Awards Act, the losing defendant can only reject the
plaintiff's lawyer's fee by hiring his own attorney. Also, when a lawyer works for his own
client, he adjusts the amount of time spent in preparation according to the magnitude of the
results sought and the client's ability to pay. There are no such restraints on counsel apply-
ing for a fees award, and overpreparation can result. Therefore, "consistency would be a
hobgoblin, rather than a virtue." Id. at 676. However, consistent evaluation of factors evalu-
ated is an absolute necessity.
107. See text accompanying notes 87-94 supra.
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Corp.,0 s incorporated the Third Circuit's guidelines 09 and estab-
lished standards for attorney's fees awards in complex federal liti-
gation.110 The Grinnell court noted as important for valuation: the
number of hours the attorney spent on the case; the value of the
attorney's time;"' and additional relevant factors comprising the
"risk of litigation.1 1 2 The case was remanded to the district court
for a determination of the award. In 1977, the Second Circuit re-
viewed the district court's determination of award,113 and criticized
the lack of substantiation by the lower court. This appears to indi-
cate the Second Circuit's intent to substantively review and com-
ment upon attorney's fees awards made by lower courts.114
The Second Circuit, however, has not used Grinnell effectively
to develop consistent standards for the calculation of fees awards.
In addition, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rarely reviews the
actual amounts of awards or the factors on which awards were
based. s15 Although this leaves the discretion to determine awards
with the court most familiar with the litigation, the district
court,11 6 it does not indicate to prospective litigants the appropri-
ate standards for an award. Appellate comment indicating either
approval or disapproval is necessary to guide district courts in
evaluating the various factors and to apprise plaintiffs and their
attorneys of the likelihood of receiving an adequate award. If the
Court of Appeals declares entitlement to the award but remands
108. 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974). Brought under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970),
Grinnell was an antitrust class action.
109. Id. at 473.
110. Id. at 468 n.12.
111. Valuation obviously requires some fairly definite information as to the way
in which that time was spent (discovery, oral argument, negotiation, etc.) and by
whom (senior partners, junior partners or associates). Once this information is
obtained the easiest way for the court to compute value is to multiply the num-
ber of hours that each lawyer worked on the case by the hourly amount to which
attorneys of like skill in the area would typically be entitled for a given type of
work on the basis of an hourly rate of compensation.
Id. at 471. Note the similarity between the Grinnell standards and Berger's proposal, see
text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
112. Id.
113. 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).
114. Id. at 1098.
115. Grinnell, on appeal, 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977), establishes certain guidance,
but, as noted, Grinnell itself was an antitrust suit.




the case to an unreported evidentiary hearing, the effect of appel-
late review is lost. In Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U,
Inc.,117 for example, the plaintiffs requested an award of $20,831.
The Court of Appeals remanded for a hearing, consistent with
Grinnell's standards. From this, the prospective litigant does not
know precisely which of the Grinnell standards will be applied,
what weight each will be given or what documentation the court
will require.
Two months later the standard in the Second Circuit was fur-
ther complicated when in Prate v. Freedman 8 the court pur-
ported to apply the Fifth Circuit's Johnson standards. The Second
Circuit's failure to articulate clear standards means that one dis-
trict court adheres to Grinnell for record keeping and Johnson for
standards,119 while another relies on Grinnell (I) and (11)120 for
standards in setting amounts. Later suits indicate that the problem
is becoming worse. In Holley v. Lavine the award was negotiated1 21
and no mention was made of the factors used. The court noted
only the amount of the award. The prospective litigant and his at-
torney gain no information on the guidelines used since they are
not noted.12 2 Even where they are noted, without meaningful ap-
pellate review and comment, the standard remains too vague for
plaintiffs and their attorneys to depend upon.
B. Applicability of Standards to Special Circumstances in the
Second Circuit
The position of the Second Circuit is also unclear in two other
areas: whether time expended on fees appeal should be compen-
sated under the Awards Act, and whether publicly or federally
funded lawyers should be compensated at the same rate as private
attorneys. Lack of certainty in these areas further reduces a pro-
spective litigant's capability to attract competent counsel.
117. 578 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1978).
118. 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1978).
119. Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1274, 1281 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
120. Boe v. Colello, 447 F. Supp. 604, 610 n.114 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
121. 605 F.2d 638, 642 n.6. See Note, supra note 9, at 372.
122. In Susan B. v. Clifford, Civ. No. 78-823 (unpublished memorandum and order of
Judge John T. Elfvin of the western District of New York), for example, plaintiff's attorney
award was arbitrarily reduced because the judge concluded that "not all of- the time .
spent was reasonably necessary." Id. at 7-8. The judge's conclusion is not explained.
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1. Fees Appeals Congress stated that awards should be made
"for all time reasonably expended on a matter."1 23 Because law
suits vary in complexity and amount of time spent in litigation, the
lawyer, generally, must wait until final resolution to receive a fee.
Then it is often necessary to litigate the fees award. Most circuits
allow the cost of litigating the appropriate fee to be included in the
fees award.124 The Third Circuit's reasoning is representative of
the majority of the circuits: "[1]f an attorney is required to expend
time litigating his fee claim, yet may not be compensated for that
time, the attorney's effective rate for all the hours expended on the
case will be correspondingly decreased.
'125
The Second Circuit, however, has not adopted a policy. The
court concluded in Gagne v. Maher that the fees for litigating the
award would be compensable, because "'[to] hold otherwise would
permit a deep pocket losing party to dissipate the incentive pro-
vided by an award through recalcitrance and automatic ap-
peals.' ",126 Although this statement seems to indicate a policy deci-
sion to grant awards for fees appeals, the court in Holley v. Lavine,
decided after Gagne, did not allow any additional amount for the
fees appeal. 27 No reconciliation of the two positions was offered.
Though it is within the court's discretion to grant or deny awards
for fees appeals, some articulation of its reasoning is necessary to
clarify the distinction for future litigants.
2. Awards to Publicly Funded Legal Services Congress re-
corded that the "prevailing party is entitled to counsel fees even if
represented by an organization or if the party is itself an organiza-
tion, 1 28 citing with approval Fairley v. Patterson,2" in which the
123. S. REP., supra note 7, at 6; SounRc BOOK, supra note 1, at 12.
124. First Circuit- Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978).
Fourth Circuit- McPherson v. School Dist. #186, Springfield, Ill., 465 F. Supp. 749, 759
(S.D. IMI. 1978).
Fifth Circuit- Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979); Cole v. Tut-
tle, 462 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
Sixth Circuit- Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 643
(6th Cir. 1979).
Eighth Circuit- Crain v. City of Mountain Home, Ark., 611 F.2d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 1979).
125. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978).
126. 594 F.2d at 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1979), quoting Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609,
614 (lst Cir. 1977). (Brackets in Gagne.)
127. 605 F.2d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 1979).
128. SouRCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 216.
129. 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974).
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attorney's employment with a publicly funded agency was held to
be irrelevant to the issue of whether or not to award attorney's
fees. When the plaintiff is represented by a publicly funded attor-
ney, defendants frequently argue that publicly funded legal ser-
vices organizations should not recover attorney's fees, or, if permit-
ted, awards should be limited to costs. A majority of the circuits
have upheld awards to legal service agencies, on the same basis as
to private practitioners.130 These courts reason that granting fees
to publicly funded agencies increases the agencies' ability to re-
present needy litigants " and that any other result would give the
losing defendant an advantage. This advantage would encourage
defendants to "litigate imprudently"' 2' by refusing out of court
settlement or by "inundating the plaintiff with discovery requests
without fear of paying the full value of the legal resources wasted
in response." 133 To interpret the Awards Act to allow less than full
recovery to publicly funded plaintiffs' attorneys creates an "obvi-
ous loophole" in the Act, and there is no indication that Congress
intended that result.""
The Second Circuit recognizes the need to grant fees to public
service organizations, but makes an unfathomable distinction be-
tween federally and publicly funded firms. For example, a full fees
award was granted to the publicly funded Puerto Rican Legal De-
fense. and Education Funds, Inc. in Torres v. Sachs, "5 but the
130. D.C. Circuit. NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Copeland v. Mar-
shall, No. 77-1351 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1980).
First Circuit. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1978).
Third Circuit. Willett v. Chester Water Authority, 447 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Fourth Circuit- Walston v. School Bd. of Suffolk, 566 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977);
McManama v. Lukhard,. 464 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Va. 1978).
Sixth Circuit- Carl v. Dempsey, 445 F. Supp. 942, 944-45 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
Seventh Circuit- Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. IlM. 1978).
Eighth Circuit: Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 466 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Iowa
1979).
Ninth Circuit Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980).
See generally Note, Award of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARv. L. REv. 411
(1973).
131. See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732 (D. R.I. 1979) ("The award of attor-
ney's fees, all of which goes to the organization, is a means by which representation can be
expanded to more litigants in civil rights cases." Id. at 736).
132. Copeland v. Marshall, No. 77-1351, slip op. at 38 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1980).
133. Id.
134. Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1980).
135. 539 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
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award in EEOC v. Enterprise Assoc. Steamfitters Local 683136 was
reduced because the National Employment Law Project was pri-
marily federally funded. In Torres, the court recognized that a
publicly funded attorney should be fully recompensed because it
helps assure continued service to other needy litigants, and encour-
ages further litigation of basic rights vindicating unlawful discrimi-
nation.13 7 Although the EEOC court noted that these same goals
are met through federally funded agencies that use attorney's fees
awards to expand activities, 38 the fee award was approved as re-
duced by the district court.139 Similarly, in Gagne v. Maher,40 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals approved a 30% reduction of the
award because the plaintiff's attorney received federal funding,
even though the attorney had not yet received any federal funds
and eligibility was limited to particular suits.
The Second Circuit should indicate whether federally funded
attorneys will continue to be compensated at less than full value,
on what basis the reduction is to be made and how it is computed.
It is unclear whether the fees award will continue to be reduced
and if so whether the reduction will be the proportion of federal
funding or be by an arbitrary standard.
C. Possible Solutions to Unclear Standards in Fees Awards
Determinations
Legislation could provide the standards now lacking at the
federal level.141 These statutes focus the court's attention on the
issue to be determined: the market value of the services performed.
Once it is determined that the right vindicated justifies an award,
the relative importance of that right should not affect the amount
of the award. This eliminates an important discretionary compo-
nent from awards determinations. However, if Congress does not
act to establish national standards, the states could act through
their legislatures.
California courts offer a different solution. They have retained
the Private Attorney General Rule, holding that Alyeska did not
136. 542 F.2d 579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1976).
137. 538 F.2d at 13.
138. 542 F.2d at 593.
139. Id.
140. 594 F.2d 336, 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
141. See generally Hermann & Hoffman, supra note 3.
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foreclose state courts from applying their own laws on attorney's
fees.142 In addition, California courts award attorney's fees when
the litigation results either in the enforcement of an important
right affecting public policy or in conferring a significant benefit on
the public, or a large class of persons if "the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement are such to make the award appro-
priate. '143 The right vindicated need not be a constitutional right,
thus disposing of the complexities that arise when a fee claim and
a non-fee claim are joined. While California's double remedy
makes more litigants eligible for awards, it does not address the
problems of precise standards for determining the amounts of fees.
Without these standards, lawyers cannot predict their fees well
enough to risk handling complex and lengthy public interest
cases.
1 4 4
A "market value" approach has been suggested 45 as a stan-
dard that attorneys could easily apply. Under this theory, an attor-
ney's hourly rate is presumed to already include "an amount nec-
essary for each hour which is billed to cover the numerous hours
which for one reason or another cannot be billed.1 46 Because the
attorney's hourly fee has a built-in contingency factor that in-
cludes failure in a litigated case or no fee payment there is no need
to multiply the hourly rate by a "risk of failure" factor.1 47 The at-
torney's normal rate multiplied by the hours expended would be
awarded. This, of course, raises fears of abuse.
Courts have considered ways to restrict the possibility of
abuse and still give attorneys an adequate standard. One sugges-
tion is a "cost-plus" approach: the litigating firm's cost plus a rea-
sonable margin of profit.1 48 However, this method has been re-
jected because courts fear that dividing a firm's fee into overhead
costs, imputed salaries for partners, and reasonable profit would
require overwhelmingly complex calculations, inquiries and admin-
142. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano III), 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1977).
143. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
144. McDermott & Rothschild, Foreward: The Private Attorney General Rule and
Public Interest Litigation in California, 66 CAL?. L. REv. 138 (1978).
145. Copeland v. Marshall, No. 77-1351, slip op. at 20-76 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 1980)
(Wilpey and Tamm, JJ., dissenting).
146. Id. at 21, dissenting opinion (emphasis eliminated).
147. Id. at 24, dissenting opinion.
148. Id. at 30, dissenting opinion.
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istration. 4 9 "Cost-plus" would also yield lower fees to public inter-
est firms because it focuses on lawyers' salaries rather than on
services.150
Finally, many solutions to fees award determinations are
based on the twelve Johnson factors. Some focus on evaluating
and weighting the factors; 51 others on eliminating those which are
unnecessary; 52 and still others on creating descriptive mathemati-
cal formulas that courts can apply.153 However, all agree that
"[t]he overriding consideration is that the fee award be fair to all
the persons involved including... the lawyers."'"5
CONCLUSION
A fixed set of reasonably consistent standards for applying the
Awards Act is important to attorneys, clients, courts and society.
The Act was promulgated to attract private litigants who would
enforce civil rights laws by assuring them adequate representation.
Without clearly articulated standards offering minimal certainty
on amounts awarded, the very purpose of the Awards Act is
defeated.
The Second Circuit should adhere to the practice in other cir-
cuits of requiring the district courts to articulate the method used
for calculating the award. The basis for awards and appeals should
be clearly established. Attorneys and clients could then evaluate in
advance the factors the court will use to formulate an award, and
make an informed decision on whether or not to litigate, and what
records must be maintained. Otherwise attorneys will be economi-
cally discouraged from accepting civil rights suits.
Consistent and predictable standards could be developed by
the Second Circuit's use and refinement of the Grinnell standards
or an articulated reliance on the Johnson factors. The Grinnell
standards, although developed in an antitrust case, are applicable
because awards under the Act were intended to be governed by the
same standards which prevail in other types of complex litiga-
149. Id. at 31, dissenting opinion.
150. Id. at 35, dissenting opinion.
151. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
152. See note 97 and accompanying text supra. See also Hammond, Stringent New
Standards for Awards of Attorney's Fees, 32 THP Bus. LAW. 523 (Jan. 1977).
153. Brown, supra note 100.
154. Id. at 310.
[Vol. 29
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS
tion.155 The Grinnell approach has much to recommend it. It
essentially reduces the calculation to establishing the lawyer's pre-
vailing rate and multiplying that number by the hours reasonably
expended in the suit. This formula simplifies both lower courts ap-
plication and appellate review, and consequently results in a
"framework which would allow practitioners to understand what
actions the court wishes to encourage and to conform their behav-
ior accordingly."'156 Alternatively, consistent and articulated appli-
cation of the Johnson factors would produce the same result.
H.A. ZioNTs
155. S. REP., supra note 7, at 6; SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 12.
156. See Note, supra note 9, at 372.
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